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the dramatic action of this play. He supplies stage directions, which Frulovisi did not provide, and he translates glosses of names, which the playwright placed at the head of most
scenes. Some of the former, for example, "Putting some moves on him" or "Clerus says
'ooh' and exits," heighten the comic effect. Smith occasionally adds an internal gloss for
clarification, too, as when "Quid mihi faciet?" is translated "What will she do for me on
credit" or the simple "liberi" becomes "foolish children." Footnotes cite the numerous
verbal parallels to ancient Roman comedy, and in one instance the translator has invented
a passage of dialogue where a lacuna occurs in the unique manuscript of the plays. Finally,
the book's layout is attractive, and misprints are infrequent (e.g., "blanditu" in the note
on p. 70 should be "blanditur," while "Fulovisi" on p. 156 must, of course, be "Frulovisi").
A main theme of Peregrinatio is fortune. Indeed, fortuna and its cognates appear frequently in the text. Given his own generous endowment of ill fortune, it is no wonder that
Frulovisi composed such a piece, although he was, as Smith asserts, "his own worst enemy."
Perhaps now that his play is brought to light again after its long repose in obscurity, his
luck is changing.
RONALD

E. PEPIN, Colchester, Conn.

PATRICK J. GEARY,

The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe. First paperback
ed. Princeton, N.J., and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003. Pp. xi, 199. $16.95.

In this stimulating book, which is aimed at "nonacademics who wonder about the relationship between past and present," Patrick Geary challenges contemporary claims to sovereign territorial rights based on descent from those who settled Europe during "the formative period of European identity that was the first millennium." While his intended
audience may sometimes have a hard time following the argument, which assumes, for
example, a good grasp of the differences between the early and later Roman Empire, his
major point is solidly made. The notion that any modern European people or nation originated as a homogeneous group, related by blood, speaking the same native language, and
sharing the same culture, especially if made in the name of the barbarian successor states
in post-Roman Europe, is wrong. There were no such groups. The polyglot, multiethnic
armies of the barbarian confederations had no common identity until they settled down
under successful warrior aristocracies, who then provided for themselves, and those who
identified with them, an invented past. Ethnic nationalism has always been rooted in myth,
not history. In the present and the past, claims to be a people are really "appeals to become
a people."
Geary begins with the "crisis of European identity" that has followed the breakup of the
Soviet Union and the massive population movements of recent years. In the face of migrations on a scale not seen in centuries, Europeans are once again asking what constitutes
national identity. Is it blood or common allegiance? What does it mean to be French,
German, or Bosnian? Those who argue that blood is the key have invoked attitudes, like
racism and anti-Semitism, and provoked destructive forms of behavior, above all genocide,
that most Europeans thought they had left behind. Chapter 1 argues that premodern Europeans had little, if any, sense that ethnicity and sovereignty ought to, or ever did, coincide.
The urban/rural divide had more geographical significance than any imagined borders between ethnic groups, and distinctions between lords and peasants more social consequence
than those between, for example, Germans and Poles. The nineteenth century changed all
that, especially because of the new science of philology, which made language a primary
means of defining identity. "National" languages were created, and others disappeared.
Political leaders claimed descent from people who had spoken or written earlier forms of
the now official language. Ethnoarchaeologists supported these claims with evidence that
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ancient peoples had distinct material cultures that corresponded to their common linguistic
heritage. As a result, the ethnic nationalist increasingly replaced the republican citizen as
the ideal political actor.
While most people today recognize that political ethnicity is a recent invention, many
continue to believe that cultural ethnicity is ancient and uncomplicated. In order to show
that it is not, Geary turns to the origins of ethnography in antiquity (chapter 2). He begins
with Herodotus, who, in his characteristically observant and nonjudgmental manner, described a variety of ways in which ancient peoples formed, reformed, or disappeared. Herodotus's Roman successors, however, disagreed. According to them, there were only two
kinds of people: those whose identity arose from their participation in history, that is, in
civilization; and the barbarians, who were part of the natural rather than the human world
(an attitude that the author notes, tellingly, is still apparent in museums of natural history,
which include exhibits on "other" cultures along with minerals, plants, and animals). Jews
shared with Romans the notion that they were constituted as a nation under a common
law, and Christians inherited both of those constitutional identities. The fluid social conditions of late antiquity then provided fertile soil for combining biological (or ethnic) and
constitutional notions of identity into new hybrids through "ethnogenesis." The next three
chapters, which trace shifting identities between Romans and barbarians from the third to
the eighth centuries, take a detailed look at this process.
In the restructuring that followed the crisis of the third century, the Roman Empire
changed its policy in regard to the barbarians. Instead of annihilating them, they were
incorporated into the imperial structure as contingents of the military, "the primary vehicle
of Romanization, the only truly Roman institution in the empire." Thus barbarian and
Roman identities began to merge. In the fourth and fifth centuries, the first of two types of
barbarian "nations" appeared. The most successful were the Visigoths and Ostrogoths,
who took up stable places in the imperial order but kept separate legal and religious identities. The result was a bipartite social order: "orthodox, Roman, and civilian" on the one
hand; " Arian, barbarian, and military" on the other. Their separateness was, however, their
undoing. Long-term success came only to the second type, typified by the Franks and AngloSaxons, who accepted orthodox Christianity. In the post-Roman kingdoms they founded,
the distinction between barbarian and Roman broke down and by the year 600 had all but
disappeared. From then on, barbari tended to be foreigners, especially pagans, and Romani
people who lived in Rome itself or in areas under the control of Constantinople. Moreover,
regardless of ancestry, elites identified themselves with the ruling social order, whether it
called itself Visigothic, Frankish, or Lombard. The "last barbarians," such as the Continental Saxons and the Slavs (and, presumably the Scandinavians, although Geary's geographical and chronological boundaries do not extend quite that far), went through a
similar process of ethnogenesis. Byzantine-Slavic wars, for example, led to the emergence
of Croats, Serbs, and Bulgars, none of whom had any ethnic identity before their emergence
out of defeated military confederations.
In the final chapter Geary turns briefly to how the Carolingians complicated things by
giving ethnic laws to subject peoples and to the Frankish elites who were sent to rule over
them, thereby creating a "medieval mess." After concluding that "myths of common descent and a shared history . . . masked the radical discontinuity and heterogeneity that
characterized late antiquity," Geary then returns to the question of why so many of us still
believe myths of ethnic nationalism by turning his sights to Africa and the origins of the
Zulu nation. The standard history of the Zulu is, like the history of the peoples of Europe,
the creation of nineteenth-century historiography. Its author, A. T. Bryant, was steeped in
the same traditions as everyone else in the West: the Bible and Greco-Roman ethnography.
Thus he saw the Zulu people as a stable, enduring actor, slowing emerging into a dominant
role in southeast Africa over a period of centuries, culminating in the triumph of "the Zulu
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Julius Caesar," King Shaka. Historians of Africa have recently deconstructed that version
of Zulu history, and the result is something very much like the new barbarian history Geary
describes. As in late antiquity, the influence of power and wealth from a "major external
factor"—in this case "the European commercial system"—led to rapid social change, competition, and the rise of new chieftaincies, the most successful of whom, like the Zulu,
incorporated others into their identity. The success of Shaka Zulu was so great that in a
generation or two the descendants of the conquered were sure that their grandfathers had
been Zulu, too.
Geary describes this recent revisioning of Zulu history as "less dependent on European
models," than Bryant's, but I disagree. It depends on a tradition of scientific scholarship
that lets evidence rather than expectations guide us and that is comfortable with contingency and chance—something like the attitude of Herodotus, which is as "European" as
the racism and ethnocentrism Geary so rightly fears. It was in these final pages, too, that
I had to take exception to another of the author's assertions. He concludes that "the history
of the peoples of Europe in the early Middle Ages cannot be used as an argument for or
against any of the political, territorial, and ideological movements of today, any more than
the future of KwaZulu-Natal can lie with the 'correct' interpretation of the life of King
Shaka." But isn't that exactly what this book means to do? And why not? If some abuse
history to divide and destroy, then I see no reason why historians should not use it as well
to counter them, especially if doing so promotes some measure of peace in our ail-tootroubled world.
FREDERICK

S. PAXTON, Connecticut College

Gerardi Magni Opera omnia, 111: Prolegomena ad Gerardi Magni
Opera omnia, by Rudolf Th. M. van Dijk, O.Carm.; 1/2: Gerardi Magni Contra turrim
Traiectensem, ed. Rijcklof Hofman. (Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaeualis,
192.) Turnhout: Brepols, 2003. Pp. 817; black-and-white figures and tables. €320.

GERARDUS MAGNUS,

Gerard Grote (1340-84), the primary founder of the Devotio Moderna, was the author
of a number of works, which Rudolf van Dijk classifies as follows (p. 433): autobiographical works and excerpts (Ausziige), those against focaristae (women who cohabit with
priests) and against simony, sermons and tracts, letters by and to Grote, Latin and vernacular translations, and the Book of Hours. He treats the doubtful and wrongly attributed
works as distinct categories. The first modern editions of some of these works were published by T. A. and J. Clarisse in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the 1930s Titus
Brandsma made plans to publish all of Grote's works as part of a larger publication program, entitled Opera Litteraria Deuotionis Modernae, but the intervention of World War II
and the death of Brandsma in Dachau called a halt to these plans. From its very origin in
1968, the Titus Brandsma Institute for the Study of the History of the Spirituality of the
Low Countries in Nijmegen has had as its objective the publication of Grote's works.
However, it was not until 1986 that Rudolf van Dijk, a member of the Titus Brandsma
Institute, was given the mandate to make preparations for the publication of Grote's complete works as part of the Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaeualis, series. The
Clarisses and Brandsma were just some of the more prominent individuals who intended,
but never did manage, to publish all of Grote's works before the Titus Brandsma Institute
once again took up the challenge. Van Dijk (pp. 601-29) offers a comprehensive overview
of all the various efforts made since the beginning of the nineteenth century to publish
Grote's opera omnia. He concludes with an account of the Titus Brandsma Institute's plans
for its publication of Grote's works in six volumes, a breakdown of which is found on
pages 625-26.

